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The article describes key aspects of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” the-
sis. It acknowledges the way in which that thesis has picked up on some key changes in
relation to the role of religion in public life and, especially, in international relations. But it
also critiques the thesis for its “essentializing” and “bloc” approach to cultures and soci-
eties, arguing that such an approach does not take sufficient account of the differences and
sometimes fault-lines and conflicts within societies and cultural groups. For what might
characterise appropriate religiously informed responses to Huntington’s thesis, the article
proposes an approach based on four “keynotes” of “modesty”, “integrity”, “realism” and
“distinctiveness”. 
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The Re-Emergence of Religion
1989 was the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was also the year in which The
Satanic Verses (Rushdie, 1988) controversy became public in the UK and then went glob-
al. In that context, the British socialist political elder statesman, Tony Benn (in The
Guardian, 7.4.89), offered the following reflection:
“Now, all of a sudden, arguments which had almost disappeared into the mists of time
have to come into sharp focus and are hotly contested across the world, involving diplo-
matic relations, trade arrangements and stretching into the heart of religious communities
where people of different religious convictions have to live side by side.”
In this febrile atmosphere, with the disappearance of the “enemy other” of
either “communism” or “capitalism”, a number of commentators began to identi-
fy new potential “enemies” on the global map and did so by prophesying coming
cultural and religious conflicts. Especially well known for this was Samuel
Huntington, and more specifically his thesis about the so-called “Clash of
Civilizations”. 
Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations
The origins of Huntington’s thesis can be found in a 1992 lecture given by him at the
American Enterprise Institute. Perhaps significantly for how the thesis eventually came to
be used in justification of certain foreign and military policy stances, the terminology of
“clash of civilizations” had previously been used by the American Orientalist, Bernard
Lewis, in a 1990 Atlantic Monthly article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”. 
The thesis as Huntington was to develop it after his American Enterprise Institute lec-
ture was first published in the journal Foreign Affairs under the title of “The Clash of
Civilizations?” (Huntington, 1993). That article was then followed up by a book of similar,
but in fact not precisely the same, title. The title of the book was to become The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of Global Order (Huntington, 1997). 
In view of the talismanic status that Huntington’s basic thesis had by then begun to
acquire in a number of political circles - especially among the so-called “Neocons” in the
USA – both the addition to, and the subtraction from, the original article title are significant.
The subtraction was the removal of the question mark associated with the original title.
What began as a set of questions had now developed into a thesis to be more sharply
advocated. And with the removal of the question mark, another dimension had been
added – namely that of a concern with global order; or perhaps more specifically, the
implications of Huntington’s thesis for US global hegemony. 
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In considering Huntington’s thesis it is important to bear in mind that his thesis
became a lightning rod for controversy and generated more responses than any other
essay published in the history of the journal Foreign Affairs. Because of this, it can some-
times be difficult to distinguish what Huntington actually said from what is written about him
and his thesis. It is also important to recognise that others may share aspects of
Huntington’s perspective without necessarily subscribing to his overall thesis; or certain-
ly without subscribing to the way in which the thesis was used as justification for particu-
lar foreign policy stances and military actions.
Therefore during the period in which Huntington was writing there were other – at
least at the time - less well known voices who, while sharing something of Huntington’s
analysis about the emerging importance of culture and religion within the field of interna-
tional politics, did not necessarily share his specific evaluation of civilizational blocs, or the
use to which some of this thinking was put by certain politicians. One of these was the later
scourge of British New Labour Government economics, the now politician and Liberal
Democrat Treasury spokesperson, Vince Cable.  In a 1994 booklet entitled The World’s
New Fissures: Identities in Crisis (1994: 4-5) Cable had put forward an argument that: 
The thesis advanced here is that as the old division between left and right
fades away a new one is appearing, centred on different ways in which people
define their identity.
and also that: 
...now there are special reasons why cultural identity - whether based on
religion, language, race, region, nation, clan or tribe - is gaining greater impor-
tance as a vehicle for political interests and grievances.
Cable furthermore argued that the rise of this politics of identity was to be located
within the impact of globalisation. Globalisation, he pointed out, reduces the significance
of the nation state as an intermediate political and economic system whilst increasing the
significance of international and universal factors as well as highly localised ones. 
This kind of emphasis on culture and religion was in considerable contrast to the posi-
tion of around a half a century ago. In the 1960s, in both the so-called “First” and “Second”
Worlds, there had been a strong sense that religion might fade away from the public
sphere, if not perhaps disappear altogether, through the impact either of industrial capi-
talism and the consumer society in the West, or that of atheistic communism and material-
ism in the East. 
However, this disappearance did not happen. Furthermore, as religion re-appeared
especially in the international sphere, it did so in ways that were strongly associated with
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conflict and violence. And in general public consciousness, at least, this has often been
associated with Islam. Thus one could refer to Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechenia, Bosnia-
Herzogovina, 9/11, 7/7, and Afghanistan. Each of these is etched firmly into our contempo-
rary religious and political consciousness as bloody episodes that have involved at least
dimensions relating to religion and culture. 
It is these events, followed by 9/11, the Bali bombing, the Madrid Bombing, 7/7 in
London, and other similar atrocities or “near misses” that have led to a view among a
number of political circles – and especially among the so-called “Neocons” in the USA -
that Huntington’s thesis has been vindicated.  Of course, alongside these conflicts that
involve Muslims, there has also been the continuing running sore of the national conflict in
Northern Ireland connecting in communal terms with Protestants and Catholics; the armed
insurgency in the Punjab for an independent state Sikh state of Khalistan; the Sri Lankan
conflict over Tamil Eelam in the largely Hindu north of Sri Lanka; and so on.
But what is Huntington’s thesis? Initially it was an argument developed in response to
Francis Fukuyama’s (1989, 1992) earlier thesis of “The End of History” which was also
influential in the post-Cold War period (and was another essay, the title of which when
developed into a book, lost its original question mark). Broadly speaking, Fukuyama had
argued that, on the other side of the collapse of Communism, there were no real “alterna-
tives” left except the further technocratic development of the western economic and dem-
ocratic model. Fukuyama’s argument was, of course, advanced before the near global
meltdown of the international banking and finance system through which the world has
recently lived! 
Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington thought that while ideological options had come to an
end, this meant that the world had reverted to a pre-existing - and what he argued was an
historically more “normal” - state of cultural and religious conflict, and that this would
become the main basis for conflict in the future. Thus, in his original article, Huntington
(1993: 22) argued that:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will
remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of glob-
al politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The
clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civiliza-
tions will be the battle lines of the future.
What is notable about Huntington’s thesis is that it depends upon a prior position con-
cerning the possibility of identifying and delineating civilizational groupings. In identifying
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these Huntington, like the British historian Arnold Toynbee (1956) before him, seems to
give some primacy to shared religion, but also to some extent to linguistic similarity as
well as to geographical proximity. However, there is some inconsistency in how
Huntington approaches civilizational classification although, broadly speaking, he identi-
fies the following civilizational groups:
• Western civilization (with Latin America and Russia in question re Orthodox world)
• The Eastern world of Buddhist, Sinic, Hindu and Japonic groups
• The Muslim world of the “Greater Middle East” (stretching across Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, to Indonesia etc)
• Sub-Saharan Africa
Huntington also speaks of what he calls “cleft” countries: in other words those that
embody tension between the civilizations as, for example, in the case of India (with its
Hindu majority and substantial Muslim minority), and the Ukraine (with its Western
Catholic and Orthodox regions). Out of all this, Huntington also identifies what he calls
“challenger civilizations” – and these are the “Sinic” and the “Islamic”. The “Sinic” chal-
lenge he sees as driven by the emergence of Chinese economic power, but under gird-
ed by a strong cultural identity, and to which the wider region might be likely to ally itself
under Chinese primacy. The “Islamic” challenge he sees as being driven by a huge pop-
ulation expansion and by internal and external instability linked with what he calls “Islamic
resurgence”. He also perceives what he calls an emergent “Sino-Islamic connection”
based on both civilizations having shared conflicts with the West - particularly in terms of
models of human rights and democracy.  
He then identifies Russia, India, and Japan as “swing civilizations” that might ally with
one or other civilizational bloc. He also speaks of what he calls “torn countries”, which are
countries with historical origins in one civilization, but which are seeking to affiliate with
another. An example of this would be Turkey’s aim to join the European Union which, if it
comes about, could be the first successful cross-affiliation. Finally, Huntington argued that
the conflicts that might occur could be either “fault line” conflicts or “core state” conflicts.
“Fault line” conflicts he sees as local between adjacent states of different civilizations,
while “core state” conflicts would take place on a global level between the major states of
different civilizations.
A key part of Huntington’s thesis of relevance to our overall topic and context today
is that he argues that civilizational conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims
and non-Muslims and that “Islam has bloody borders” (Huntington, 1993: 35). Huntington
dates this back to the Ottoman military thrust into Europe. He argues that what he sees as
this proclivity to conflict is fuelled by a number of factors. Firstly, he argues that both Islam
and Christianity are missionary religions that seek the conversion of others. Secondly, that
both are what he calls “universal” or “all-or-nothing” religions in terms of truth claims.




Thirdly, that both are “teleological” in that they claim to offer solutions to the goals of
human existence. In his book he further developed these lines of argument to contend that
the bloodiest conflicts of the twenty-first century would be those to do with the Western-
Islamic clash. The shock of 9/11 - which many people struggled to make sense of -
seemed for many to confirm Huntington’s analysis. 
“The Clash of Civilizations”: An Evaluation
That there has evidently been something going on here in terms of what one might
call shifting “fault-lines” in the social, political and economic worlds needs to be acknowl-
edged. But it is arguable that the approach taken by Huntington - and even more so by
those who have translated his thought into policy stances – has had a tendency to over-
simplify, essentialise and reify what has been occurring in terms of the division of the
world into a number of “cultural blocs”. 
This kind of approach to interpreting the world of “the other” was one that those who
were involved in East-West reconciliation work during the Cold War will recall. In those
days what was the popular Western image of a monolithic Communist “bloc” was a big
over-simplification. The differences between Yugoslavia and the German Democratic
Republic were profound. Even among Communist-ruled countries with shared member-
ship of the Warsaw Pact there were substantial differences. Because of that, during the
Cold War it would have been more accurate to have referred to “spheres of interest” or
“spheres of influence” rather than to “blocs”. 
So, also, in relation to Huntington’s notion of “civilizational blocs”, one might more
accurately speak of civilizational, cultural and religious “spheres of interest” or “spheres
of influence” within which there is a much more complex, contested and fluid situation
than any more “solidified” notion of a “bloc”. Moreover, as argued by the German polit-
ical philosopher, Dieter Senghaas (2002) in his book The Clash Within Civilizations:
Coming to Terms with Cultural Conflicts, the main cultural and religious fault-lines that do
exist actually run through, between and within geo-political and cultural groupings rather
than between them.
Such an understanding of the dynamics of the contemporary world is closer to what
had already been presciently identified around half a century ago by the historian Arnold
Toynbee (1956: 139) who argued that culturally and religiously the world was moving
from what could be described as the “pattern of a patchwork quilt” to what could more
accurately be described as the “texture of a piece of shot silk”. Or, as the American schol-
ar of religion Diana Eck (2000: 135) has put it in a recent essay on “Dialogue and Method:
Reconstructing the Study of Religion”, the map of what she calls our current “georeligious
reality” cannot “be color-coded as to its Christian, Muslim, Hindu identity”. 
In the light of all this, perhaps the real challenges of the present may be less fearsome
that the image of monolithic cultural blocs reminiscent of the Cold War enemy images
tends to evoke. But, if the issues may be less fearsome than such “bloc” thinking suggests,
they may also in reality be more problematic and intractable precisely because of their
complexity. They may also be more universal because they affect not only the borderlands
between different societies, but also the challenge of living together with diversity within
all societies.
Partly in critique of Huntington, alternative concepts have been developed. Thus for-
mer President Katami of Iran proposed a “Dialogue of Civilizations”, which was taken up
by the United Nations in naming 2001 as the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. More
recently, at the 59th General Assembly of the UN in 2005, Spanish President Zapatora and
Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan, proposed the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative.
However, while there are alternative initiatives such as the above, it is important to
acknowledge that there are real issues here - in which religious traditions, individuals,
communities, groups, organisations are caught up because of what might be called the
“culturization” and/or “religionization” of conflict. And in the context of this, there are real
questions for how religions might respond?  So, in the remainder of this paper I want to
try to briefly outline four keynotes that I think should characterise any response or helpful
contribution that the religions may make. And these four keynotes are, I would suggest:
“modesty”, “integrity”, “realism” and “distinctiveness”.
Modesty
An important starting point for any response from religious people is an appropriate
modesty on the part of the followers of these great world religions. The high ideals of the
religions may be one thing, but no religion exists in the abstract. The individuals, groups
and communities that have actualised the religious traditions of the world have been his-
torically ambiguous. Religions have undoubtedly contributed positive impulses to the
development of civilizations themselves. But they have also exacerbated and sometimes
created serious conflicts and suffering. Both realities need to be acknowledged.
In the Cold War era, supporters of a socialist political and economic alternative to
capitalism had to deal with the issues arising from the contradictions between their ideals
of socialism and the historical societies of what became known as “really existing social-
ism”. In relation to how Marxist-Leninist one-party rule actually functioned, many socialists
and Marxists tended either to idealise the picture or else, like the Trotskyists, to denounce
the realities of “really existing socialism” as not being the real thing. As with “really exist-
ing socialism”, among its self-uncritical supporters there is a lot of “hot air” talked about
“really existing religion”. Religious believers can be as self-deludingly in love with their
image of themselves as some Marxists and socialists were. Or, perhaps more dangerous-
ly still, they can cynically proclaim the efficacy of their religion in order to maintain its influ-
ence and power over the lives of those who live within its sphere, whilst no longer really
believing in what they proclaim. 
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Like many socialists and Marxists, many religious “mainstreamers” cannot, it seems,
come to terms with how they are actually seen and experienced by those of other reli-
gions or none. They often cannot properly see and acknowledge the force of the secular
critique about the responsibility of religious communities for injustice of various kinds,
from ethnic violence through to domestic violence. Others, like those Trotskyites who
wished to maintain that they were the true and “pure” exponents of socialism or Marxism,
try to find comfort in distinguishing the “true Christianity” or the “true Islam” from “really
existing Christianity” or “really existing Islam”. While one can understand the wish of this
argument to separate out the original vision of religions from the negative forms of their
historical actualisation, in the end this will not do. Religions do not exist in the abstract and
have to be evaluated by the actual effects of those who, in history, identify themselves with
these religions, including those whom some religious believers would rather did not bear
the name of their religion. 
At the same time, while acknowledging the betrayals of humanity by religious com-
munities in human history it is important to assess what, positively, the religions can bring
and also to question the failures of the secular movements of the previous century. It is
often argued that it has been the rise of the secular spirit, and its adoption by states and
societies, that has enabled some degree of religious co-existence and overcome the
inheritance of religious absolutism. In the judgement of post-Enlightenment secular liber-
als, religions have been responsible for an enormous amount of bloodshed and human
suffering and for this reason it is safer to keep them marginalised from public life. That
there is considerable truth in this judgement must be acknowledged. 
But is there not also a too easy moral superiority among secularist critics of religion?
Indeed, it can cogently be argued that the formation of modern nation-states and the oper-
ation of modern secular ideologies have led to just as much, if not more, human suffering
than have states founded upon religion. Thus, while acknowledging the betrayals of
humanity by religious communities in human history the phenomenon of the secular
nation-state can hardly be uncritically glorified in the light of the 20th century that saw the
nationalistic blood-letting of the First World War; the impact of colonialism and capitalism
upon the Two Thirds World; the gas chambers of Nazism; the gulags of Stalinism; as well
as the rape of the planet caused by the unsustainable and headlong technological
exploitation of finite natural resources to meet the demands of profit. Therefore, alongside
a critical self-evaluation on the part of religious groups, what might perhaps also be
required is a critical re-evaluation of what is meant by the “secular” (see Weller, 2006). 
The right not to believe has been an important social and religious gain and religious
people have often needed secular critique. There is, for religious traditions and groups,
no going back behind this. At the same time, both religious and non-religious people need
to recognise that the notion of a “secular state” is highly context-specific. How far a secu-
lar state actually allows or not the full participation and contribution of religious organisa-
tions and groups depends upon the question of what is meant by “secular” in the context
of a particular societies and states. 
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“Laïcité” in France is different from “secular state” in India, and also the separation of
Church and state in the USA, and different again from Kemalism in Turkey, and from the
position in China today. Thus, among other possibilities, the idea of a “secular state” may
imply one or more of the systematic attempt to exclude religions from the public sphere;
the creation of an arena in which religious participation is encouraged but religious com-
munalisms are challenged; or it may give constitutional embodiment to the non-establish-
ment of particular religions and to the promotion of religious freedom. In this connection,
one of the significant conclusions to emerge from a November 1998 Council of Europe
seminar on the topic of “Religion and the Integration of Immigrants” was that: “It was
underlined that the use of the term ‘secular’, referring to the relationship between the State
and religion, should be re examined and clarified on a pan-European level, with a view to
reaching a common understanding.” (Council of Europe, 1999: 173)
But if religions do have positive something to offer, this cannot be on the basis of any
“triumphalism” over and against the secular in which religions are naïve about their his-
torical and contemporary record. To argue for this is not to suggest that religions need to
have a kind of “false modesty” in which self-criticism leads to indulgence in superficial
guilt or “breast-beating”. Such an approach, in contrast with that of an appropriate and
proper modesty, does not facilitate positive developments, but rather leads to the paraly-
sis that leaves the world to the mercy of realpolitik devoid of values. Rather, an appropri-
ate modesty is one that is based on recognising limitations and failings, and on being
ready to share with and learn from people of other religions and none; while also being
ready to make a contribution based on the integrity of what is distinctive about one’s own
religious tradition.
Integrity
Self-critique within particular religions does need to be informed by careful listening
to those in other religions as well as to those from outside of religions. But in the final analy-
sis it needs to be based upon the integrity of the religion concerned. While religions do,
as historical communities, have a highly problematic record in relation to the rights of
humanity, ultimately they do also point to something beyond themselves. 
It is in the light of that to which they point, and to which they seek to give historical
expression but with which they are not completely identified, that religions ultimately live.
It is also in the light of that which they believe that they themselves will as much and, in fact,
more so than others, be judged. It is such an in-built critique against the absolutisation of
their own claims when evaluated alongside their actualisation of these in historical commu-
nities that has given religions a remarkable capacity for self-critique and renewal. It is a
capacity that has been evidenced over the centuries as prophetic and charismatic figures
have arisen from within each of the religions who have critiqued their own religions from
within in as strong, if not stronger, terms than those mounting a critique from outside. 
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This capacity for self-critique and renewal is of great importance in the context of the
rise of identity politics and the potential role of religion in this. It is this which counteracts
what can otherwise be a tendency for the traditional Christian affirmation of “Jesus is Lord”
to become a tribal call of triumphalism over and against people of other than Christian reli-
gions, when what it should be is a challenge to those who confess Jesus as Lord as to
whether they are actually living their lives in the spirit of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth.
Such an understanding of the importance of self-critique might also lead to asking the
question of whether, when crowds of Muslims cry “God is Great”, they might thereby be
expressing collective anger and frustration about their position of felt impotence in a world
of power seemingly ranged against them as much or more than affirming trust and confi-
dence in the One whom Islam affirms is “the Compassionate, the Merciful, the Lord of the
Universe, the Ruler of the Day of Judgement”.
In contrast with approaches of impotent anger or of triumphalism, the integrity of reli-
gions demands an acknowledgement of their very real diversity and resistance to an
unjustifiable reification of dynamic and diverse “imagined communities” (see Anderson,
1983). In his classic 1978 book, The Meaning and End of Religion the historian of religion
Wilfred Cantwell Smith famously protested against reification into “religions” of what he
prefer to speak of in terms of the “personal faith” of individuals and “cumulative traditions”
of groups of people. As long ago as 1974, in a neglected, but still resonant, essay on
“Communalism and the Social Structure of Religion” Trevor Ling (1974: 61) argued that:
“The fact that such/terms have been invented and have gained currency is no guarantee that
they refer to real objective recognisable entities, each possessing a sufficiently high degree
of internal unity to justify the degree of external differentiation which the terms imply”.
“Community” is, of course, the now near ubiquitous word of public discourse that is
pressed into service to denote the dimension of religious life connected with self-identity.
However, increasingly, both in social and political debates and in academic studies, the
uses of this word have a tendency to mystify rather than to clarify. If the description “the X
community” is used as anything other than a shorthand notation for a particular stream of
religious life, it can portray a misleading picture of assumed homogeneity that is often sig-
nificantly at variance with the much more complex, multi-layered, sometimes fragmented
and even fractured realities that it seeks to denote.
At the same time, the postmodern penchant for deconstruction can be taken too far
when used to deny the utility of anything that goes beyond the isolated self. While it is no
doubt the case that all “imagined communities” can be deconstructed in relation to the
diversities of belief, gender, age, social class, and sexual orientation, the fact that collective
identities are appealed to indicates that they do function in a social way. By imagining these
identities, they are actually brought into social being and have social effects, whether they
“should” be recognised or not. The need is to recognise this. The danger, as Ling has
argued (1974: 66), is that such constructions of sharply defined religious identities “arise out
of concealed quasi-nationalisms, and they advance concealed quasi-nationalistic causes.”
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A focus on religious rights and equity, unbalanced by the corrective of the keynote of
integrity can lead religions into being overly concerned with pressing for their rights. Of
course, there are good reasons for why religious groups should be able to claim and
assert their rights to freedom of belief and its manifestation as guaranteed in various inter-
national human rights instruments. There are also sound arguments in terms of equity and
inclusion that discrimination on the grounds of religion should be taken as seriously and
tackled as vigorously as discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, gender and disability.
But there is a real danger that religions might be seduced by the politics of identity into
competitive forms of communalism that sacrifice the original creative visions of the tradi-
tions to a contemporary politics of identity that all too easily becomes an identity politics in
which the absolutisation of such identities results in projects for the “religious cleansing” of
those with “other” identities. Such projects can take shape in forms of proselytism that,
while eschewing violence and legal suppression, nevertheless deny the “other” their reli-
gious freedom to be themselves in psychological, social and religious terms. 
In more extreme cases, in the Balkans we have seen how such “communalist” proj-
ects can issue in the physical violence of recent attempts to carry out “religious cleansing”
through the enforced geographical displacement of the religious “other” and/or their lit-
eral liquidation. The dangers are clear. Religions could develop an identity politics that is
more concerned with their own “rights” than with the spiritual roots by which the histori-
cal manifestations of religions are ultimately to be judged.
Nevertheless, as the Christian theologian Robin Gill argued in his 1975 book, The
Social Context of Theology: A Methodological Enquiry, theological variables can also
become social determinates. In other words, religions are agents as well as actors within
social processes and there is nothing inevitable about them going down the communalist
road.  From within their own identity and tradition, religions do have the means of critique
to preserve them from these dangers. 
Thus, within the Hebrew scriptural tradition that is shared by both Jews and
Christians, there is a powerful prophetic critique of the way in which the call of Yahweh to
form a covenant people can all too easily be transmuted into a “politics of peoplehood”
which forgets that, alongside “the chosen people” of the Hebrews the Lord also calls
“Egypt, my people” and speaks of “Assyria, whom I created” (Isaiah 19 v. 25). It also con-
tains a critique that reminds the people when Temple is destroyed and they are exile, that
God is the God of the nations and not of one place, time or people to the exclusion of all
others, and that this God can raise up and use within His purposes even foreign and pagan
powers, such as the Persian emperor Cyrus (Isaiah 45). Finally, there is the denunciation
of those who pressed the transcendent into the service of an identity politics when they
chanted “The Temple of the Lord, The Temple of the Lord” (Jeremiah 7 v. 4) as though this
somehow granted them absolute security and absolved them of any accountability in rela-
tion to the demands of justice.
European Journal of Economic and Political Studies
93
Realism
When reflecting on the response that religions might make to Huntington’s thesis,
there can sometimes be a tendency to take refuge in generalisations about religions being
bearers of sources of value that are needed in the world and to proclaim these loudly,
without acknowledging the diversity among the religions, or the problem of how their val-
ues are translatable into the everyday world. 
In fact, religions have profound differences - at least in how they wish to actualise
apparently shared values. For example, it is often said “we all believe in the family”. But
do we? Or at least, do we all do so in the same way? At the same time, while there may
be real differences about the ways in which their values are translated into specific ethi-
cal stances, religions do, nevertheless, hold to a number of absolute convictions. In con-
trast to a post-modernist ethical bricolage, the values espoused within the various reli-
gious traditions are not up for general negotiation. Therefore, for example, from the per-
spective of religions, it does matter - and absolutely, not just relatively - whether the poor-
est in the world die as a consequence of the political and economic systems that maintain
the “comfort zones” of the rich. 
Thus, religions are a reminder that the way in which a society lives and organises
itself is neither natural nor inevitable, nor is it the only possible way for a society to be.
Rather, it is the way that a society has chosen for itself. Religions bear witness to things that
cannot be seen, touched, smelled, tasted and heard, but which are essential for a more
balanced perspective on what is experienced in these ways. In so far as they allow them-
selves to be informed and shaped by the originating visions embodied within them, reli-
gions can offer important alternative visions to profit, unlimited consumption and notions
of endless progress as the criteria by which social life is organised.
All of this is of great importance in a political context where, among mainstream polit-
ical parties few, if any, real alternatives are being offered to the dominant and underlying
global economic system of market capitalism and the choices that are implied are there-
fore only (while still, relatively speaking, important) between more or less unbridled ver-
sions of the same thing. But the difficult challenge that religions face is how to translate their
visions of the “ultimate” into the “penultimate” without losing their integrity. 
At the same time, religions cannot expect perfection in this world and any contribu-
tion that they might hope could make a real impact on the social, political and economic
structures of the world, needs to be realistic. It is not enough to do the religious equivalent
of proclaiming how good apple pie is. To paraphrase Marx, the point of religion is not to
theorise about the world and the people within it, but to facilitate change in both. But
change requires engagement with the world, and not just proclamation of values to it, nor
- however valuable this may be for modelling something different - simply the creation of
sub-cultural alternatives based on religious values. 
In many societies there are once again increasing opportunities for engagement of
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that kind. For example, in the UK, as the Local Government Association’s Faith and
Community: A Good Practice Guide For Local Authorities puts it (2002a: 3, para 2.3), reli-
gions are often once again recognised by public authorities as “sources of values and com-
mitment” As the Local Government Association’s Guidance on Community Cohesion
(2002b: 21) expresses it, “All major faiths promote equality and respect for others as a fun-
damental value. In most cases, at a personal and community level, this translates into good
community relations and integrity in public life. Such values can be a real resource in the
practical implementation of community cohesion strategies.”
But in such opportunities, there are also tensions. This is because Government, and
also political and human rights movements, when they want religions as partners, natural-
ly want them for political and practical purposes. But religious groups must be able to feel
that they can contribute on the basis of an integrity rooted in their own self-understanding.
To be realistic does not mean to abandon the visions and dreams that inform religious per-
spectives on the world, but it does entail the need to take the risk and to accept the respon-
sibility of trying to translate ultimate values into penultimate historical projects and there-
fore also accepting the possibility of getting it wrong.
It is in the place between the original visions of religions and their historical actuali-
sations that the realistic contributions of religions might be found. This entails their living
within what the German language gives good expression to as a Spannungsfeld (field of
tension). Within this, “really existing religions” have to find a way of living in the “in-
between” of the provisionality of their “now” and the ultimacy of the visions and truth-
claims that inspire them. They have to find a way of negotiating between the absolute seri-
ousness of an engaged religious commitment, an intellectual humility and ethical self-crit-
icism together with a willingness to critique their historical forms of organisation.
Distinctiveness
In contrast with an earlier era in which religions were more generally frozen out of
the public sphere, one of the interesting things about the last decade or two has been how,
in many contexts, both nationally and internationally, there are now initiatives to re-con-
nect the institutions and initiatives public life with religions. Thus, in the USA there has been
the development of “faith based” partnership initiatives in civil society (see Wuthnow,
2004). In England and Wales, the “New Labour” Government has encouraged local
authorities to engage religions fully in Local City Partnerships and similar initiatives (see
Weller, 2005). 
In many ways this is not surprising. One of the lessons of the failure to build political-
ly and economically alternative states in the Europe of the twentieth century was that
healthy states need a healthy civil society. In the context of a general fragmentation and
weakening of voluntary forms of association, religions remain a key form of belonging
beyond the individual and their immediate family. In contrast to many other forms of vol-
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untary association based on mutual self-interest and/or a single shared characteristic, the
religious sector of civil society includes people with wide varieties of other social, eco-
nomic and ethnic belongings.
On a national level, in an era in which national governments of all kinds are more
modest about what can be done centrally and about their need for social partners to
implement social policy there has been a growing emphasis on the importance of what
has been identified in the work of Robert Putnam (2003a, 2003b) as ”social capital”. In that
context, there has also emerged a recognition that religions, their communities and organ-
isations have extensive human and physical resources with geographical “reach” and that
they play substantial role within the community and voluntary sector of civil society. In
general, religions wish to take up these opportunities. But in taking them there is a danger
that religions will simply be seen, and if not careful could allow themselves to become, one
voluntary sector group among others. As will hopefully be realised from what was argued
earlier on, to argue that they should not simply be this is not at the same time to argue or
imply that religions are somehow superior. But while there is a need for religions to be
realistic about the ways in which governmental bodies will relate to them, if the contribu-
tion that religions might make is to be informed by integrity, then any such contribution
does need to be characterised by the distinctiveness that the religions bring.
That this is possible can again be illustrated from the UK by the Local Government
Association’s Faith and Community report.  While noting that “Faith groups are an impor-
tant part of the voluntary and community sector”, this report (Local Government
Association, 2002a: 3) also recognises that they have “distinctive characteristic and poten-
tial of their own.” Government wants religions as partners for practical and political pur-
poses. Religious groups may well offer partnership in good governance because of their
wish give historical and practical expression to their commitments in relation to what they
understand to be the ultimate and the unconditioned roots of their tradition. But it is also
precisely because of the nature of these roots that religious groups may become suspi-
cious and resistant to any possibility that they are merely co-opted into government agen-
das. Governments tend to want dialogical partners that are “safe” and will deal with rela-
tively “safe” topics in “safe” ways. 
Religions do have important - albeit often significantly differing - things to contribute
about, for example, values in relation to families and their role within society.
Contributions of this kind are likely to be welcomed by the “powers that be” in the con-
text of general concerns about the creation of stable environments within which children
and young people can be inducted into becoming mature participants in the rights and
responsibilities of adult members of society. Governments welcome values for their con-
tribution to community cohesion. But what about values that disturb the status quo in serv-
ice of social justice? - or even more sharply, in the service of economic justice? 
Thus it can seem that, if they want the participation of religions at all, Governments
can too often want their participation only or, primarily, for purely utilitarian or instrumen-
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talist purposes. There can be problems of potentially dangerous distortion if the ultimate
is rather made subservient to the penultimate and the unconditioned to the conditioned.
This is because utilitarian purposes often ignore or try to filter the disturbing aspects of
religions that challenge the status quo in favour of those aspects that appear to support and
confirm it, thus “domesticating” religions. Do governmental “powers that be” look for, and
even try to create, “mainstream” and “establishment” dialogue partners that only mirror
their own image? Might such dialogue partners become detached from their constituen-
cies and promote only mutual self-confirmation? Such “instrumentalisation” and “domes-
tication” of religions undermines their integrity, and it is one of the reasons why religions
do well to resist any suspicion of co-option and the governmental “powers that be” also
do well to avoid both the reality and the possible (mis)perception of that. 
At the same time, failure on the part of religions to engage with the public sphere on
the basis of their distinctiveness as religions is not an expression of realism rooted in
integrity. Rather, it is more a symptom of either a false modesty or of a reluctance to accept
responsibility within the contingent ambiguities of history.  
In the international sphere, acting as part of the Non-Governmental Organisation sec-
tor, religious organisations and groups have global networks, perspectives that can offer
alternative means of communication and information. In the days of the Cold War in Europe,
the Christian Churches on both sides of the Berlin Wall often functioned as an important
bridge of alternative information and perspectives in contrast to the peddling of enemy
images. So, also today, in the context of a dominant “clash of civilizations” ideology, reli-
gious organisations can offer important alternative channels for challenging simplifications
in relation to global “blocs” of religions. In this they can give important reminders that there
are, for example, Christian Palestinians and Christian Iraqis (see Rassam, 2005), and that
there are millions of Muslims in the “West”, not least in the European Union and in the USA. 
In the contemporary world, we are at one and same time seeing the massive exten-
sion of the media through satellite and cable TV and internet technologies, and yet also the
severe narrowing of what is actually represented through these media. As between them,
CNN and Rupert Murdoch’s media empire carve up the news networks, religious com-
munities and organisations, being part of global communities of faith, can become impor-
tant alternative channels of information and communication. They present perspectives
that challenge the individual escapism and collective selfishness of consumer societies.
But they can also offer more complex pictures of the diversity of these societies than the
simplistic demonisation of them that, for those who suffer on the underside of history, can
be an all too seductive simplification of the reality of the “West” (see Pearse, 2003).
Conclusion
In closing, I want to end with something from the Indian Christian and former Director
of the Dialogue Unit of the World Council of Churches, Stanley Samartha. In an essay of his
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on the topic of “Religious Identities in a Secular State”, Samartha (1991:57) argued for the
importance of maintaining a distinctive vocation of religions over and against both the vac-
uous superficiality of consumer secularism and the dangerous forms limited belonging
based upon blood and ethnicity: 
In an age dominated by science and secularism one of the tasks of genuine-
ly religious people is to draw attention to the Mystery of transcendence, a centre
of values, a source of meaning, an object of loyalty beyond the smaller loyalties to
one’s particular caste language or religion.
Finally, in words taken from the scriptural writings of the religious tradition with which
the writer is personally identified - that of the Christian tradition - I would offer three foot-
notes. For what religions might contribute to inter-cultural and inter-civilisational dialogue:
“Where there is no vision, the people perish” (Proverbs 29 v. 18). For the actual contribu-
tions made by religions in this field: “By their fruits you will know them” (Matthew 7 v. 20).
And in dealing with the power structures of the world: “Be wise as serpents and gentle as
doves” (Matthew 10 v. 16).
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